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Posts
Against philosophical canons: How I became a canon-shredder
Published:
Recently I published a piece in Sandra Lapointe and Erich Reck’s wonderful anthology with Routledge, Historiography and the Formation of Philosophical Canons. There I offer a conceptual analysis of philosophical canons according to which they are dogmatic practices. Then I argue that philosophical canons, so understood, undermine the ultimate practical point for which we have them, which point is to faciliate better philosophy. Even taking a very broad range of views of what counts as “better philosophy” the argument shows that philosophical canons are self-undermining because, no matter what authors, texts, and traditions they contain, they undermine the practical point for which they exist.
Against Huemer’s ‘Against History’
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In a recent post at Fake Noûs, Michael Huemer asks why we have history of philosophy as a specific field of academic research. In Section 1, Huemer agrees that reading the works of dead philosophers is important and worthwhile. It is agreed that dead philosophers’ works are usually mined for the sake of creating a formulation of a problem. When this is done by a philosopher of sufficient disciplinary influence, and their work gets enough uptake among other philosophers, this formulation can become canonical and set the agenda for a subset of living philosophers.
Literature on the Empty Domain
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The state of play in the empty domain, pun-intended, seems to be this: nobody has really gotten a generally satisfactory proof theory and semantics for (non-free) inclusive logic—logic inclusive of the empty domain. I think that getting a satisfactory semantics for it stands to benefit discussions of metaphysical nihilism—the view that, possibly, there are no concrete entities—a priori justification for contingent claims, and of proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics for logic.
Why should we care about believing what is true? Using Trivialism to Answer
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I was recently asked how I motivate caring about what we believe (to students, but this applies to plenty of non-students). Likely most philosophers are already sold on believing what is true and holding consistent beliefs. And if someone already cares about being right, about being consistent, and about believing truly, your work is done as soon as you explain it what the issue is. But not everyone cares about believing truly and holding consistent beliefs. How do we sell them on it?
Digging in a Library Basement (Pt. 1)
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In summer 2017, I was awarded a T. Anne Cleary International Dissertation Research Fellowship to travel to the Bertrand Russell Archives at McMaster University. My dissertation focuses on Russell’s philosophy of logical atomism. So visiting the Archive was a real treat, and truly helpful in getting a more complete picture of Russell’s logical atomism. I am grateful to the University of Iowa Graduate College for their generous support of my first archival adventure! In this series of three posts, I will give an overview of my trip, talk about what it was like to work in the Russell Archives, and then discuss the historical data I found that aided my research.
Blog Post number 3
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This is a sample blog post. Lorem ipsum I can’t remember the rest of lorem ipsum and don’t have an internet connection right now. Testing testing testing this blog post. Blog posts are cool.
publications
Conceptual Engineering or Revisionary Conceptual Analysis?
Published in Dialogue, 2021
Abstract
Conceptual engineers have made hay over the differences of their metaphilosophy from those of conceptual analysts. In this article, I argue that the differences are not as great as conceptual engineers have, perhaps rhetorically, made them seem. That is, conceptual analysts asking 'What is X?' questions can do much the same work that conceptual engineers can do with 'What is X for?' questions, at least if conceptual analysts self-understand their activity as a revisionary enterprise. I show this with a study of Russell's metaphilosophy, which was just such a revisionary conception of conceptual analysis.
Recommended citation: Elkind, Landon D. C. (2021). "Conceptual Engineering or Revisionary Conceptual Analysis?: The Case of Russell's Metaphilosophy Based on Principia Mathematica's Logic" Dialogue 60(3), pp. 447-474. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0012217321000317
Computer verification for historians of philosophy
Published in Synthese, 2022
Abstract
Interactive theorem provers might seem particularly impractical in the history of philosophy. Journal articles in this discipline are generally not formalized. Interactive theorem provers involve a learning curve for which the payoffs might seem minimal. In this article I argue that interactive theorem provers have already demonstrated their potential as a useful tool for historians of philosophy; I do this by highlighting examples of work where this has already been done. Further, I argue that interactive theorem provers can continue to be useful tools for historians of philosophy in the future; this claim is defended through a more conceptual analysis of what historians of philosophy do that identifies argument reconstruction as a core activity of such practitioners. It is then shown that interactive theorem provers can assist in this core practice by a description of what interactive theorem provers are and can do. If this is right, then computer verification for historians of philosophy is in the offing. <\details> <!--[Download paper here](http://academicpages.github.io/files/paper3.pdf)
Recommended citation: Elkind, Landon D.C. "Computer verification for historians of philosophy". *Synthese*, First View, Special Issue: Metaphilosophy of Formal Methods, 1(3). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03678-y
The Contact Argument: A Little Unduly Simple?
Published in American Philosophical Quarterly, 2022
Abstract
The contact argument is widely cited as making a strong case against a gunk-free metaphysics with point-sized simples. It is shown here that the contact argument’s reasoning is faulty even if all its background assumptions and desiderata for contact are accepted. Further, the simples theorist can offer both metric and topological accounts of contact that satisfy all the contact argument’s desid-erata. This indicates that the contact argument’s persuasiveness stems from a tacit reliance on the thesis that objects in contact are inseparable: the simples theorist must allow that separated objects might be in contact. The concluding section critically considers this contact-separability thesis and argues that rejecting it is not so terrible. The upshot of all this is that the contact argument is simply unconvincing.
Recommended citation: Elkind, Landon D. C. (2022). "The Contact Argument: A Little Unduly Simple?" American Philosophical Quarterly 59(3), pp. 247-261.
research
talks
On ‘Vagueness’
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Newman v. Russell
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On Russell’s ‘‘Vagueness’’
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Abstract
I argue that Bertrand Russell's 1923 ''Vagueness'' has wrongly endured long-standing criticism in the secondary literature on metaphysical vagueness. I divide the most com- mon criticisms of Russell into three 'myths', as I call them. I then indicate why none of these three myths is justifed by the light of a close reading of Russell's 1923 piece. The upshot of dispelling the myths is inviting work on *representationalism*, the view that metaphysical vagueness is a feature of representations.
For Inclusive Logic
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The Nature of Russell’s Sense-Data
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The Nature of Russell’s Sense-Data
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The Logical Atomism of Bertrand Russell
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Workshop: Bertrand Russell’s The Philosophy of Logical Atomism: A Centenary Celebration
Looking for Wittgenstein’s Logical Atomism
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A theorem of infinity for Principia Mathematica
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Abstract
I prove a theorem of infnity for *Principia Mathematica*. The proof requires altering the meta-theory of *Principia*. In *Principia* we have a simple type theory with a lowest type (call this 'simple ℕ-type theory'). Our key idea is to allow for infnitely-descending types just as there are infnitely-ascending types; that is, we allow our simple type theory to be not well-founded (call this 'simple ℤ-type theory'). Given the acceptableness of *Principia*'s (well-founded) simple type theory, this adjustment is minor. This adjustment is also implicitly suggested by various remarks of Whitehead and Russell. By so-adjusting *Principia*, a core objection to Logicism--namely, that Logicism cannot recover Peano arithmetic without an axiom of infnity--dissipates.
Russell’s Problem of General Molecular Facts
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A Modal Logic without Modality
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Logical Atomism as Term Busting
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Dorothy Wrinch’s and Bertrand Russell’s promotion of his other students
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Workshop: Feminism and Philosophical Women in Russell’s Circle.
Any philosophical canon is practically self-undermining
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Abstract
There has recently been much-needed critical discussion of the current Anglo-American philosophical canons, but not as much consideration of their nature and purposes. I discuss what philosophical canons are and argue that they are social practices, and in particular, social practices of enforcing rules. I then consider what purposes a philosophical canon can have for various stakeholders. Building on Luca Castagnoli’s work on self-refutation in ancient philosophy, I clarify various notions of being practically self-undermining. I then argue that even on an inclusive view of what the purposes of a philosophical canon are, any philosophical canon is self-undermining. There is no plausible account of the purposes of a philosophical canon that is not undermined by having one, whatever its makeup.
Principia’s Logic as Conceptual Engineering
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The propositional logic of Principia in Coq
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Abstract
There have been multiple reconstructions of the propositional logic of *Principia* beginning with the artificial intelligence research of Newell, Simon, and Shaw in the 1950s, including the mechanical validity-checker of Hao Wang (see ''IBM Journal of Research and Development'' 1960), and the proof reconstructions of Daniel O'Leary using Polish notations (see *Russell* 1988). To these results I have added a fully computer-checked reconstruction of the propositional logic of "Principia" following the proof sketches indicated in that work. This talk will discuss what computer-checking *Principia* proofs in `Coq` tells us about the proof sketches, and also about the development of propositional logic between *Principia* and Russell's 1906 ''The Theory of Implication.''
The Genealogy of ‘‘v’’
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Joint work with Richard Zach (University of Calgary).
Forgetful Phil
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teaching
Teaching experience 1
Undergraduate course, University 1, Department, 2014
This is a description of a teaching experience. You can use markdown like any other post.
Teaching experience 2
Workshop, University 1, Department, 2015
This is a description of a teaching experience. You can use markdown like any other post.